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Abstract
The literature on social norms stresses that compliance with norms is approved while
deviance is disapproved. Based on this, we explore the content of social norms using
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1 Introduction
Much of the existing literature on social norms emphasizes that norms are partly sustained
by the approval and disapproval from others (Elster 1989), which suggests that social norms
might be elicited by studying what people approve/disapprove (Krupka and Weber 2008).
With this idea in mind, this paper uses data from five dictator games to explore the dis-
tribution and content of social norms. Applying the classification analysis from El-Gamal
and Grether (1995), we observe that people are heterogeneous with respect to their approv-
ing/disapproving behavior. Further, the best theory (in terms of parsimony and empirical
relevance) distinguishes two groups: Some subjects disapprove choices that harm them, while
others disapprove inefficient choices. Our study is also related to an increasing literature on
non-monetary sanctions/rewards (see, for instance, Masclet et al. 2003, Rege and Telle 2004,
Noussair and Tucker 2005, Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008, and Xiao and Houser 2008).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental design,
section 3 reports some aggregate statistics, the classification analysis is performed in section
4, and section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
We consider five binary dictator games in which the dummy has the possibility to express
her/his opinion about the dictator’s choice. Hence, each dictator game consists of two stages.
First, the dictator chooses between two payoff allocations, which differ across games. We
employed the following ECU allocations (20 ECU = 1 Euro), where the first number in a
parenthesis indicates the dictator’s payoff:
1. (180, 140) and (100, 220)
2
2. (180, 120) and (100, 100)
3. (240, 120) and (100, 120)
4. (180, 120) and (120, 180)
5. (200, 120) and (160, 160)
In the second stage, the dummy can send a closed-form, costly message (for a 10 ECU
fee) to the dictator. To implement this, we employed the strategy method. That is, for
each allocation of each dictator game, the dummy is first asked whether she/he wants to
pay the message fee. Afterwards, and independently of her/his prior answer, the dummy is
asked which of the following three messages she/he would like to send had she/he paid the
fee: “Your choice was (1) good, (2) neither good nor bad, (3) bad.” Of course, the message
is delivered only if the dummy decided to pay the fee at the allocation actually chosen by
the dictator. This method maximizes the amount of statistical evidence and prevents order
effects in our series of five games. In effect, since subjects are provided no information about
other players’ choices, we can expect no variation in their emotional mood across games (the
games were presented one at a time).
We conducted the experiment, which was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007),
in the computer laboratory at Maastricht University. In total, 180 subjects participated in
our study (most of them were students from the Faculty of Economics and Business Admin-
istration). Since this experiment is rather short, we implemented it together with another
experiment on the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game, which consisted of three different treat-
ments and whose results are reported in another paper. More precisely, after the PD finished,
subjects received instruction sheets (in neutral language) explaining the general structure of
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the dictator games (without giving information about payoff constellations), were assigned
a fixed role (dictator or dummy), and were re-matched with another participant for the five
games (all this was common knowledge). To insure that the PD does not affect behavior
in the dictator games, subjects were not informed of the results from the PD. In order to
prevent income effects only one game (among the PD and the five dictator games) was ran-
domly selected for payment. At the end of the experiment, subjects were informed about
their co-player’s actions in the payoff-relevant game. The average payment of the 45 minutes
session was about 9 Euro.
3 Aggregate Statistics
Table 1 provides an overview of the hypothetical messages that the dummies sent to their co-
players.1 We observe that in each game, one allocation receives mostly disapprovals whereas
the alternative allocation receives mostly approvals. This suggests that dummies tend to
follow some common rule, a point that we study in detail later.
Game Hypothetical Messages
Left-Hand Right-Hand Left-Hand Allocation Right-Hand Allocation
1 (180,140) vs. (100,220) 0.2778 [0.4000] 0.7333 [0.1667]
2 (180,120) vs. (100,100) 0.6889 [0.1333] 0.1556 [0.6444]
3 (240,120) vs. (100,120) 0.6222 [0.1667] 0.2000 [0.5444]
4 (180,120) vs. (120,180) 0.1778 [0.4556] 0.6222 [0.1667]
5 (200,120) vs. (160,160) 0.2000 [0.5444] 0.7333 [0.1222]
Table 1: Approval [Disapproval] rates of the dummy player in the five dictator games using hypothetical
messages.
Table 1 refers to hypothetical messages. To actually send a message, however, the dummy
had to pay a fee, which allows us to check whether hypothetical messages were chosen ran-
1Since the behavior in the dictator games does not vary substantially across the PD treatments, we decided
to pool the data.
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domly. Overall, the fee was paid in about 8.67 percent of all possible cases, and 44 (29)
messages approved (disapproved) the corresponding dictator’s choice. In general, actual mes-
sages fit similar patterns than hypothetical ones: The dummy always approved the dictator
in case she/he picked the right-hand allocation in the first, fourth, and fifth game (13, 9, and
5 times, respectively), while taking the left-hand allocation in games 1 or 2 and taking the
right-hand allocation in game 2 was disapproved most often (6, 5, and 7 times, respectively).
Our games were mainly designed to study disapproval, and not the dictators’ behavior.
However, we note that dictators chose almost always the allocation that maximized their own
payoff. More precisely, the payoff-maximizing allocation was chosen with probability 0.9888
in the first game, with probability 0.94444 in the second, with probability 1.0000 in the third,
with probability 0.9888 in the fourth, and with probability 0.81111 in the fifth game.
4 Classification Analysis
Next, we apply the classification procedure from El-Gamal and Grether (1995) to analyze
the motives behind the dummies’ disapproval. More precisely, we posit that dummies follow
deterministic decision rules when disapproving (the rules may differ from subject to subject),
but also that they deviate with probability ε > 0. This classification procedure has several
favorable attributes. By selecting the decision rule that best fits each subject’s behavior,
we can classify subjects in types. It also helps us find the best single decision rule, or the
combination of two, three, etc. decision rules that best account for the behavior in our dictator
games. Given this, we can then apply the Akaike Information Criterion to infer the number of
decision rules necessary to provide an accurate but parsimonious explanation of the pattern
of disapproval in our games. Importantly, the procedure circumvents the multicollinearity
problems that would appear in a classical regression analysis if the decision rules entered
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as independent variables and allows appropriate inferences even when testing all possible
decision rules –no matter how similar their predictions are– at the same time.
4.1 Individual Decision Rules
For simplicity, we restrict our analysis to binary rules; that is, rules indicating whether the
subject disapproves (without specifying what happens if the subject does not disapprove). Our
selection of five dictator games allows us to test seven rules that seem especially appealing.
Letting (xL1 , x
L
2 ) refer to the left-hand and (x
R
1 , x
R
2 ) to the right-hand allocation at any of our
dictator games (1 denotes the dictator and 2 the dummy), they are defined as follows:
1. The no-disapproval rule never predicts disapproval;
2. the envy rule predicts disapproval at allocation i ∈ {R,L} if, and only if, xi1 > x
i
2 –that
is, if the dictator gets a larger payoff than the dummy;
3. the reciprocity rule (see Holla¨nder 1990) predicts disapproval at allocation i ∈ {R,L} if,
and only if, the alternative allocation j 6= i is such that xi2 < x
j
2 –that is, if the dummy
was harmed by the choice of the dictator;
4. the spite rule predicts disapproval at all allocations;
5. the efficiency rule predicts disapproval at allocation i ∈ {R,L} if, and only if, xi1+x
i
2 <
x
j
1 + x
j
2, where j 6= i –that is, subjects disapprove socially inefficient choices;
6. the equity rule predicts disapproval at allocation i ∈ {R,L} if, and only if, |xi1 − x
i
2| <
|xj1 − x
j
2|, where j 6= i –that is, subjects disapprove inequitable choices; and,
7. themaximin rule predicts disapproval at allocation i ∈ {R,L} if, and only if, min{xi1, x
i
2} >
min{xj1, x
j
2}, where j 6= i –that is, subjects disapprove deviations from a maximin or
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Rawlsian norm.
Table 2 presents the predictions of the non-trivial rules in the five dictator games.
Game Predictions of Disapproval
Left-Hand Right-Hand Left-Hand Allocation Right-Hand Allocation
1 (180,140) vs. (100,220) EN, RE EQ, MA
2 (180,120) vs. (100,100) EN, EQ RE, EF, MA
3 (240,120) vs. (100,120) EN, EQ EF, MA
4 (180,120) vs. (120,180) EN, RE
5 (200,120) vs. (160,160) EN, RE, EQ, MA
Table 2: Predictions of disapproval in the five dictator games. The following notation is used: EN=envy,
RE=reciprocity, EQ=equity, EF=efficiency, MA=maximin.
4.2 Methodology
Let D be the set of all dummies (of cardinality n), S be a set of k (k = 1, 2, ..7) of the above
mentioned rules, and f∗ : D → S be a mapping that assigns every dummy d to the rule in S
that fits best the disapproving behavior of d in the dictator games. That is, if Xd(S) denotes
the maximum number of times that dummy d follows a rule in S, this mapping assigns each
dummy to the corresponding rule in S –in case of a tie, the dummy is “divided” equally among
the tied rules. Observe that mapping f∗ induces a partition of D in k sets {Di(S)}
k
i=1.
No model (S, f∗) is likely to replicate perfectly the dummies’ actual behavior and we
must allow for some error. More precisely, we posit that every dummy deviates from her
corresponding rule at each allocation with probability ε > 0. Therefore, the probability
that dummy d follows her rule Xd times out of her 10 choices is (1 − ε)
Xd · ε10−Xd , and the
probability that our data is generated by model (S, f∗) equals:
k∏
i=1
∏
d∈Di(S)
(1− ε)Xd(S) · ε10−Xd(S). (1)
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Given this, one can show by standard optimization techniques that the maximum likeli-
hood estimation of the error rate for the model (S, f∗) coincides with the proportion of overall
deviations:
εˆ =
10 · n−
∑n
d=1 Xd(S)
10 · n
.
Observe that for any two models (S, f∗) and (T, f∗) such that S ⊂ T it is necessarily
the case that εˆT ≤ εˆS . However, model (T, f
∗) is more complex than (S, f∗) and it is hence
sensible to introduce a penalty for allowing too many decision rules in a model. For this,
we use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), according to which the best model (S∗, f∗)
should maximize the log-likelihood minus the number of parameters (10 + n) · k.
4.3 Results
Table 3 presents the results of the classification analysis.
It can be seen that if we consider models with just one rule (i.e., all dummies are of the
same type), the efficiency rule describes behavior best, followed by the reciprocity and the
no-disapproval rule. If we consider models with two types of dummies, the best model has an
estimated error rate of 0.19 and includes the efficiency and the reciprocity rules (49 subjects
are assigned to the efficiency and 41 subjects to the reciprocity rule). Overall, this is the best
model in terms of parsimony and accuracy, as it maximizes the Akaike information criterion
(-637.60). In other words, our analysis suggests that disapproval in our dictator games is
mainly triggered by inefficient choices but also harming ones.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis indicates that subjects are heterogenous regarding their disapproving behav-
ior, and we identify two main norms: One commends not to harm others, while the other
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Model Error Rate AIC Assignment of Subjects
Efficiency 0.2967 -647
Reciprocity 0.3256 -668
No-disapproval 0.3344 -674
Maximin 0.3544 -685
Envy 0.4944 -724
Equity 0.5322 -722
Spite 0.6656 -764
Efficiency Reciprocity 0.1900 -638 49 EF 41 RE
No-disapproval Reciprocity 0.2122 -665 46 ND 44 RE
Efficiency Envy 0.2177 -672 53 EF 27 EN
Reciprocity Maximin 0.2388 -695 49 RE 41 MA
Efficiency No-disapproval 0.2455 -702 53 EF 37 ND
Reciprocity Efficiency No-disapproval 0.1566 -690 35 RE 33 EF 22 ND
Efficiency Reciprocity Envy 0.1566 -690 46 EF 30 RE 10 EN
Efficiency Reciprocity Equity 0.1655 -703 46 EF 34 RE 10 EQ
No-disapproval Reciprocity Maximin 0.1744 -717 40 ND 40 RE 10 MA
Reciprocity Maximin Equity 0.1811 -725 41 RE 36 MA 13 EQ
Table 3: Error rates, Akaike Information Criteria, and the optimal assignment of subjects in the best models
of 1, 2, and 3 decision rules (models with more decision rules have a very negative AIC). The following
abbreviations are used: ND=No-disapproval, EN=Envy, RE=Reciprocity, EF=Efficiency, EQ=Equity, and
MA=Maximin.
commends to achieve efficient outcomes. Further, we observe that other factors like envy
and equity play a marginal role in our games. This is somehow surprising: Since abundant
evidence suggests that inequity aversion or some kind of egalitarian motives are important to
explain monetary punishment (see Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Dawes et al. 2007, and Leibbrandt
and Lope´z-Pe´rez 2008), we expected something similar to happen with non-monetary pun-
ishment (i.e., disapproval). It seems however that the causes of monetary and non-monetary
punishment are different, a finding to be studied further in the future.
9
References
1. Dawes C., Fowler, J., Johnson, T., McElreath, R. and O. Smirnov, 2007, Egalitarian mo-
tives in humans, Nature 446, 794–796.
2. El-Gamal M. and D. Grether, 1995, Are people Bayesian? Uncovering behavioral strate-
gies, Journal of the American Statistical Association 90, 1137–1145.
3. Ellingsen T. and M. Johannesson, 2008, Anticipated verbal feedback induces pro-social
behavior, Evolution and Human Behavior 29, 100–105.
4. Elster J. (1989), Social norms and economic theory. Journal of Economic Perspectives 3,
99–117.
5. Fehr E. and K. Schmidt, 1999, A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 114, 817–868.
6. Holla¨nder H., 1990, A social exchange approach to voluntary cooperation, American Eco-
nomic Review 80, 1157–1167.
7. Krupka E. and R. Weber, 2008, Identifying social norms using coordination games: Why
does dictator game sharing vary? IZA discussion paper.
8. Leibbrandt A. and R. Lo´pez-Pe´rez, 2008, The envious punisher, University of Zurich work-
ing paper.
9. Masclet D., Noussair, C., Tucker, S. and M.-C. Villeval, 2003, Monetary and non-monetary
punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism, American Economic Review 93, 366–
380.
10. Noussair C. and S. Tucker, 2005, Combining monetary and social sanctions to promote
10
cooperation, Economic Inquiry 43,649–660.
11. Rege M. and K. Telle, 2004, The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in
public good situations, Journal of Public Economics 88, 1625–1644.
12. Xiao E. and D. Houser, 2008, Emotion expression and fairness in economic exchange,
Mimeo.
11
Exemplary Instructions
Welcome
Dear participant, thank you for taking part in this experiment. It will last about 60 minutes.
If you read the following instructions carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn
some money. The entire of money which you earn with your decisions will paid to you in cash
at the end of the experiment. These instructions are solely for your private information.
We will not speak of Euros during the experiment, but rather of ECU (Experimental Currency
Units). Your whole income will first be calculated in ECU. At the of the experiment, the
total amount you have earned will be converted to Euro at the following rate:
20 ECU = 1 Euro.
In order to ensure that the experiment takes place in an optimal setting, we would like to ask
you to abide by the following rules. If you do not obey them, we will have to exclude you
from this experiment and you will not receive any compensation.
• Do not communicate with your fellow students. If you have any doubts, raise your hand
and one of the experimenters will clarify them privately.
• do not forget to switch off your mobile phone!
• you may take notes on this instruction sheet if you wish.
• when the experiment finishes, remain seated till we pay you off.
The Experiment
In the experiment you will participate in six different scenarios, and you will be paid for your
decisions in one scenario, randomly chosen at the end of the experiment. More precisely,
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the participant playing at the computer number 9 will roll a die and we will pay you the
equivalent in Euros of your ECU earning in the scenario corresponding to the number that
turns up.
In what follows we will explain to you only the first scenario. Once you made your
decision in this first scenario, we will introduce the five remaining scenarios. Note well that
each scenario is independent of the others; that is, your payoff in any scenario does not depend
on decisions taken in other scenarios.
Scenario 1
In this scenario, you have been randomly and anonymously matched with another participant
and both of you have to choose independently between alternative X and alternative Y.
Depending on your choices, you will get the following ECU payoff:
• if you both choose X, both of you get 180 ECU.
• if you choose X and the other participant chooses Y , you get 80 ECU and the other
participant gets 260 ECU.
• if you choose Y and the other participant chooses X, you get 260 ECU and the other
participant gets 80 ECU.
• if you both choose Y , both of you get 100 ECU.
The matrix below summarizes this.
Decisions at this scenario will be private; that is, you will never be informed about the
decisions of any other participant in this scenario, and no other participant will know your
decision in this scenario. Apart of choosing between X and Y , in this scenario both of you
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The other player
X Y
You X (180,180) (80,260)
Y (260,80) (100,100)
Table 4: Payoff table.
have the possibility to send one message to the other participant with your opinion about
her/his choice. Sending a message costs 10 ECU. Since decisions are private, however, you
will not know whether the other participant chose X or Y. For this reason, we will ask you
whether you want to send message for any possible contingency. More precisely, the procedure
will consist of three steps:
1. You will be asked the following question: “Suppose both of you chose X. Do you want
to send a message paying a cost of 10 ECU?” You can choose either Yes or No.
2. Independently of your answer to the previous question, you are then asked the following
question: “Suppose you decided to send a message to the other participant in case both
of you chose X. Which of the following three messages do you send?”
• Your choice was good.
• Your choice was neither good nor bad.
• Your choice was bad.
3. The same two previous steps are then repeated for any of the other three possible
combinations of choices: (X,Y ), (Y,X), and (Y, Y ).
Observe again that decisions are always private; that is, none of you will know the choices
of the other participant when going to the next scenario (including messages). The actual
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decisions in one scenario will be anonymously revealed to both participants only if, at the end
of the experiment, it turns out that this scenario is randomly chosen for payment. If the die
selects scenario 1, moreover, each participant will receive the message selected by the other
participant at that scenario (step 2) only if the other participant previously chose Yes in step
1. Finally, observe that once the first scenario has finished, you will be matched to a different
participant for the remaining five scenarios.
Control Questions
Please answer the following control questions. Once you have written down all your answers,
please raise your hand so that one of the experimenters can check them.
1. How many different scenarios are there?
2. If you choose X and the other participant chooses X, what will be your payoff?
3. If you choose X and the other participant choosesY , what will be your payoff?
4. Are you always matched with the same participant?
5. How will your final payoff (in Euro) be determined?
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Scenarios 2–6
You will be matched throughout the rest of the experiment with a participant different from
the one you have been matched with in the first scenario. One of you will be throughout all
remaining scenarios a type 1 participant, and the other will be throughout a type 2 participant.
Your type will appear soon on the computer screen.
In what follows, we will only explain scenario 2 in detail, since the remaining four scenarios
have the same structure. As Figure 1 shows, participant 1 has to decide between two ECU al-
locations: A and B. Allocation A gives 180 ECU to participant 1 and 140 ECU to participant
2, and allocation B gives 100 ECU to participant 1 and 220 ECU to participant 2.
Participant 1 Participant 2
180 140
Allocation A
Participant 1 Participant 2
100 220
Allocation B
Figure 1: ECU allocations (to be decided by participant 1).
After participant 1 has made her/his decision, participant 2 gets the possibility to send
a message to participant 1 with her/his opinion about the choice being made. Sending a
message costs 10 ECU to participant 2. Note well, however, that participant 2 will not be
informed about the actual decision of participant 1, instead she/he is asked how she/he would
react in case participant 1 chose either of the two allocations. More precisely, the procedure
will consist of three steps:
1. Player 2 is first asked the following question: “Suppose participant 1 chose allocation
A. Do you want to send a message paying a cost of 10 ECU?” Participant 2 can either
choose Yes or No.
2. Independently of the her/his answer to the previous question, participant 2 is then asked
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the following question: “Suppose you decided to send a message to the other participant
in case she/he chose allocation A. Which of the following three messages do you send?”
• Your choice was good.
• Your choice was neither good nor bad.
• Your choice was bad.
3. The same two previous steps are then repeated with allocation B.
The same procedure applies to the remaining four scenarios, which will differ only in the
allocations available to participant 1.
Observe that decisions are always private; that is, neither participant 1 nor participant 2
will know the choices of the other participant when going to the next scenario. The actual
decisions in one scenario will be anonymously revealed to both participants only if, at the end
of the experiment, it turns out that this scenario is randomly chosen for payment. Further,
and if the die selects one of the scenarios 2 to 6, participant 1 will receive the message selected
by participant 2 at that scenario (step 2) only if participant 2 previously chose Yes in step 1.
An example will clarify these points. Suppose that scenario 2 is selected by the roll of the
die at the end of the experiment, and that participant 1 chose allocation A (180/240) in that
scenario. The following two things could then happen:
1. If participant 2 decided to send a message, then participant 1 will receive 180 ECU,
participant 2 will receive 230 ECU (240 minus the 10 ECU cost for sending the message),
and participant 1 will observe the message sent by participant 2.
17
2. On the other hand, if participant 2 decided not to send a message, then the final payoff
would be 180 ECU to participant 1 and 240 ECU to participant 2.
Similarly, if participant 1 chose allocation B (100/220) instead, the final payoff would be 100
ECU to participant 1 and either 220 ECU or 210 ECU to participant 2. The latter would
occur if participant 2 decided to send a message after participant 1 chose allocation B.
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